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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
North Australian Aboriginal
Legal Aid Service Inc v Bradley [2001] FCA 1728
NORTH AUSTRALIAN ABORIGINAL LEGAL AID SERVICE INC v HUGH BARTON BRADLEY and NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA
D 17 of 2001
WEINBERG J
7 DECEMBER
2001
DARWIN (BY
VIDEO LINK FROM MELBOURNE)
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IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA |
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NORTHERN TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY |
D 17 OF 2001 |
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BETWEEN: |
NORTHERN AUSTRALIAN ABORIGINAL LEGAL AID SERVICE INC APPLICANT |
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AND: |
HUGH BARTON BRADLEY FIRST RESPONDENT |
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NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA SECOND RESPONDENT |
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JUDGE: |
WEINBERG J |
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DATE OF ORDER: |
7 DECEMBER 2001 |
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WHERE MADE: |
DARWIN (BY VIDEO LINK FROM MELBOURNE) |
Amendment to the Reasons for Judgment of Weinberg J delivered on 7 December 2001.
Par 27 last sentence should read: "A corporation could not achieve standing simply by ..."
Par 286, line 1 should read "From the time that the government deferred or abandoned its plans to introduce ..."
Par 307, last sentence should read: "However, NAALAS submitted that ...".
Par 313, second last sentence should read: "Some of these possibilities seem ....".
Par 315, second last sentence should read: "It was Mr Bradley who said that he would commit ...".
Par 338, line 1 should read: "In my view, NAALAS' ultra vires ....".
Associate to the
Honourable Justice Weinberg:
Date: 10 December 2001
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v
D17 of 2001
In accordance with the practice of the Federal Court
in cases of public interest, the Court has prepared this summary to accompany
the reasons for judgment delivered today.
It is intended to assist in understanding the background to the case,
the issues that arose to be determined and the conclusions the Court has
reached. It must be emphasised that
this summary is necessarily incomplete.
The only authoritative pronouncement of the Court's reasons is that
contained in the published reasons for judgment.
This proceeding arose out of the appointment by the Northern Territory of Australia, on 27 February 1998, of Mr Hugh Bradley as Chief Magistrate of the Northern Territory.
The North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc ("NAALAS") operates in the "Top End" of the Northern Territory, principally to provide a legal aid service for Aborigines living in the area it services. It seeks a declaration that the appointment of Mr Bradley was invalid.
On 20 April 2000, NAALAS commenced this proceeding in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory, initially against Mr Bradley alone. The Northern Territory was later joined as a respondent.
On 13 June 2000, following application by both respondents, Justice Olney, sitting as a judge of the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory, gave summary judgment in their favour.
NAALAS appealed against that judgment to the Northern Territory Court of Appeal, which, on 16 November 2000, allowed the appeal.
The respondents sought special leave to appeal to the High Court. On 4 May 2001, special leave was refused. The Court indicated that it was preferable that consideration of the respondents' arguments be postponed until after relevant findings of fact had been made at trial.
On 6 June 2001 Justice Olney ordered that the proceeding be transferred from the Supreme Court to this Court.
The genesis of this proceeding is to be found in the
resignation, on 20 November 1997, of Mr Ian Gray, the former Chief
Magistrate. Mr Gray's resignation was well
publicised, and was said to arise, in part at least, out of the introduction of
the mandatory sentencing regime in the Northern Territory.
In the months that followed, Mr Bradley was approached to take the position of Chief Magistrate. After extensive negotiations, he was appointed by the Administrator, on the advice of the Executive Council. A large volume of documents relating to his appointment was produced on discovery by the Northern Territory. It emerged that concurrently with that appointment, the government was considering the introduction of contract or fixed term appointments for magistrates.
The evidence makes it clear that these two processes became conflated during the early stages of negotiation with Mr Bradley over his remuneration and allowances. The proposal to introduce contract or fixed term appointments, and the belief that Mr Bradley would be appointed on that basis, attracted much criticism from within the legal community in Darwin and from other sources.
NAALAS relied upon two grounds in support of its claim that Mr Bradley's appointment was invalid.
The first was that the appointment was made for one or more improper or extraneous purposes. NAALAS alleged that the Northern Territory had, by negotiating a two year Special Determination regarding Mr Bradley's remuneration and allowances, improperly secured what was in effect a fixed term appointment, thereby subverting the requirement in the Magistrates Act 1977 that magistrates be appointed to the age of 65 years. It contended that the appointment defeated an implicit requirement of that Act that judicial independence be protected. This put Mr Bradley in the position of being beholden to the government for his future remuneration. It should be noted that the allegation of improper or extraneous purpose was directed solely against the Northern Territory, and was not directed against Mr Bradley.
Secondly, NAALAS contended that the special remuneration package negotiated with Mr Bradley was ultra vires, or beyond the powers conferred by the Magistrates Act, because it applied for a period of two years only, limited to expire before he reached the age of 65, and made no provision for his remuneration and allowances at the end of that two year period.
There was a third component to NAALAS' argument, which it added only when it amended its statement of claim in this Court. That was that if, contrary to its allegations of improper and extraneous purpose, and its claim of ultra vires, the Act nonetheless authorised Mr Bradley's appointment, a number of sections of the Magistrates Act were unconstitutional. These sections were said to violate the protection afforded by Ch III of the Constitution to the principles of judicial independence.
Mr Bradley and the Northern Territory denied each and every allegation made against them. The Northern Territory challenged NAALAS' standing to bring and maintain this proceeding, and both respondents contended that the allegations of improper or extraneous purpose were not justiciable.
In relation to the question of standing, the general rule is that a person has standing to sue, in a public law case, where the court recognises that that person has an interest in the subject matter of the litigation greater than that of the general public, or what is known as a "special interest".
The evidence disclosed that NAALAS represents approximately 2000 indigenous people each year in courts of summary jurisdiction. It has responsibilities towards Aboriginal people, and the Aboriginal community generally, which extend well beyond those of providing legal representation. It occupies a pivotal role in the administration of justice in the Northern Territory.
If, as NAALAS contended, Mr Bradley was not validly appointed, he could not lawfully exercise judicial power. His decisions, many of which have affected the liberty of NAALAS' clients, would be void, and of no effect.
The Court has concluded that, having regard to NAALAS' status, and to the functions which that body performs, it has a sufficient connection with the subject matter of this litigation to amount to a "special interest". Accordingly, the Court has found NAALAS has standing to bring and maintain the proceeding.
As indicated earlier, both Mr Bradley and the Northern Territory also claimed that the issue of improper or extraneous purpose was not justiciable.
The Court has concluded that, having regard to the nature and gravity of the allegations made, the Court can properly hear and determine NAALAS' claims.
In relation to the allegations of improper or extraneous purpose, NAALAS asked the Court to infer from the large body of documents tendered that Mr Bradley's appointment was made for a purpose or purposes other than that of securing the administration of justice in the Northern Territory.
In addition to the documents tendered, three witnesses gave evidence. The Northern Territory called only Mr Shane Stone, the former Chief Minister and Attorney-General. Many persons who featured significantly in the relevant events were not called.
The Court has concluded that the inference of improper or extraneous purpose for which NAALAS contended was open on the primary facts. That inference could more readily be drawn because of the failure of the Northern Territory to call those other persons with knowledge of the circumstances leading to Mr Bradley's appointment.
Nonetheless, NAALAS carried the onus of proof in relation to the allegations of improper or extraneous purpose. The Court has concluded that NAALAS failed to discharge that onus. The fact that a purpose capable of being so characterised may have driven the government's earlier proposals to introduce contract or fixed term appointments for magistrates, and possibly the initial negotiations regarding Mr Bradley's appointment as well, did not, on the evidence, lead to the conclusion that any such purpose subsisted, or that it operated upon the impugned decision.
In relation to the allegation that Mr Bradley's appointment was ultra vires, the Court has determined that it must fail. The relevant provisions of the Magistrates Act must be given their ordinary and natural meaning. Those provisions do not demonstrate the existence of a legislative intent to secure judicial independence of the kind for which NAALAS contended.
With regard to NAALAS' constitutional argument, the Court has concluded that on the current state of the authorities, the provisions of the Magistrates Act are not unconstitutional. The courts of the Northern Territory are not federal courts. They do not exercise the judicial power of the Commonwealth. The requirements of security of tenure and undiminished remuneration contained in s 72 of the Constitution do not apply to those courts. No implication can be drawn from Ch III of the Constitution, or the Constitution taken as a whole, to support NAALAS' claim that the existence of the Special Determination, if authorised by the Magistrates Act, rendered certain of its provisions constitutionally invalid.
The Court emphasises that its decision is not, and cannot be, concerned with the wisdom of Mr Bradley's actions in accepting the Special Determination, or with the merits of the Northern Territory's proposals for the introduction of contract or fixed term appointments for magistrates. Nor is the Court concerned with what it has found to be the clumsy manner in which the Northern Territory fixed Mr Bradley's remuneration and allowances. Debate surrounding these matters may be conducted in another forum. The questions before the Court are questions of law, and can be determined only in accordance with law.
The result is that the application has been dismissed.
The full text of the Court's judgment, reported as North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v Bradley [2001] FCA 1728, will shortly be available on the Court's website www.fedcourt.gov.au.
FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
North Australian
Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v Bradley [2001] FCA 1728
COURTS AND JUDGES - judicial review - appointment of Chief Magistrate of Northern Territory - remuneration and allowances fixed by Special Determination for two years - no provision for further remuneration and allowances - whether appointment invalid as failing to secure judicial independence.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - judicial review - application by North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc for declaration that appointment of Chief Magistrate of Northern Territory invalid - standing of applicant - whether its interest in subject matter of litigation greater than that of general public - whether "special interest" - whether incorporated body takes interest of individual members - whether allegations of improper or extraneous purpose justiciable -whether such purpose must subsist at time of making of impugned decision.
STATUTES - legislation conferring unfettered power upon Administrator to fix remuneration and allowances for magistrates - whether section should be read down to ensure that remuneration and allowances cannot be reduced save in specified circumstances - whether Act manifests intention on part of legislature to secure judicial independence - Magistrates Act 1977 (NT).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - judicial power of the Commonwealth - whether Ch III of Constitution applicable to Territory courts - whether Territory courts exercise federal jurisdiction - whether implication in Ch III and/or in Constitution that Territory courts be free from executive or legislative interference - whether implication extends to tenure and remuneration of Territory magistrates - scope of s 122 of Constitution - application of principles in Kable v The Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) to Territory courts.
Magistrates Act 1977 (NT) ss 4, 4(3), 6, 7, 7(1) and 10
Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1987 (NT)
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act 1986 (Cth) ss 7(1) and 10(1)
The Constitution ss 51(xxxix), 71, 72, 72(iii), 73, 73(ii), 77(iii), 80, 106, 111, 122 and Ch III
Judiciary Act 1908 (Cth) ss 39(2), 68 and 68(2)
Northern Territory (Self Government) Act 1978 (NT)
Stipendiary Magistrates Act 1957 (WA) s 7
Magistrates Court Act 1987 (Tas) s 10
Association Incorporation Ordinance 1963 (NT)
Constitution Act 1902 (NSW) ss 53, 54 and 55
Constitution
Act 1975 (Vic) ss 77 and 85
Northern Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Incorporated v Bradley and Northern Territory of Australia (2000) 10 NTLR 103 at 117 and 119 considered
Boyce v Paddington Borough Council [1903] 1 Ch 109 at 114 referred to
Australian Conservation Foundation v The Commonwealth (1980) 146 CLR 493 at 530-531, 541, 547 and 548 applied
Onus v Alcoa of Australia Ltd (1981) 149 CLR 27 at 35-36, 41-42 and 74 applied
Shop Distributive and Allied Employees Association v Minister for Industrial Affairs (SA) (1995) 183 CLR 552 applied
Bateman's Bay Local Aboriginal Council v The Aboriginal Community Benefit Fund Pty Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 247 at 267 applied
British Medical Association v The Commonwealth (1949) 79 CLR 201 at 257 referred to
Croome v Tasmania (1997) 191 CLR 119 at 126-127 and 137-138 referred to
Truth About Motorways Pty Ltd v Macquarie Infrastructure Investment Management Ltd (2000) 200 CLR 591 referred to
Transurban City Link Ltd v Allan (1999) 95 FCR 553 at 565 applied
Allan v Transurban City Link Ltd [2001] HCA 58 referred to
Executive Council of Australian Jewry v Scully (1998) 79 FCR 537 referred to
The Queen v Toohey; Ex parte Northern Land Council (1981) 151 CLR 170 at 186-187, 193, 202-204, 215, 217 220-222, 233, 261 and 283 applied
South Australia v O'Shea (1987) 163 CLR 378 at 410-411 referred to
Barton v The Queen (1980) 147 CLR 75 referred to
Maxwell v The Queen (1996) 184 CLR 501 at 533-534 referred to
Waters v Acting Administrator of the Northern Territory (1993) 46 FCR 462 at 479 referred to
Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] 1 AC 374 at 398, 407, 411-412 and 418 referred to
Minister for Arts, Heritage and Environment v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1987) 15 FCR 274 referred to
Xenophon v South Australia (200) 78 SASR 251 at 253-254 and 263-265 referred to
Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1 at 18, 33-34 and 35-36 considered
Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 referred to
Municipal Council of Sydney v Campbell [1925] AC 338 referred to
Thompson v Randwick Corporation (1950) 81 CLR 87 referred to
Arthur Yates & Co Pty Ltd v The Vegetable Seeds Committee (1945) 72 CLR 37 at 67-68, 75 and 83-84 referred to
Kable v The Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51
at 65, 77-78, 87, 98, 101, 102, 103, 106-107, 109, 111, 115, 116-117, 118, 134,
136, 137, 139, 141, 142 and 143 applied
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The King v Bernasconi (1915) 19 CLR 629 at 635 and 637 considered
Spratt v Hermes (1965) 114 CLR 226 at 242-243, 255-256, 257, 264, 265, 266, 278 and 280-281 applied
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200 CLR 322 at 332, 336-341, 340, 348, 353 and 382 applied
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Grollo v Palmer (1995) 184 CLR 348 at 365, 376-377 and 392-394 referred to
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to
R v Sussex Justices; Ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256 at 259 referred to
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Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island (1997) 150 DLR (4th) 577 considered
Ly v Jenkins [2001] FCA 1640 considered
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Adams v Chas S Watsons Pty Ltd (1938) 60 CLR 545 at 555 referred to
A Hamilton in The Federalist Nos 78 and 79 "The Judges as Guardians of the Constitution" and "The Position of the Judiciary" (A Hamilton, J Madison and J Jay The Federalist (1961, Harvard University Press pp 495 and 497))
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NORTH AUSTRALIAN ABORIGINAL LEGAL AID SERVICE INC v HUGH BURTON BRADLEY and NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA
D17 of 2001
WEINBERG J
7 DECEMBER
2001
DARWIN (BY
VIDEO LINK FROM MELBOURNE)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Par
No
The history of these proceedings 3
NAALAS' allegations 11
Mr Bradley's defence to NAALAS' allegations 12
The Northern Territory's defence to NAALAS' allegations 14
The issues 16
NAALAS' submission 17
The Northern Territory's objections to NAALAS' standing 24
The principles which govern standing 28
Conclusion regarding standing 51
(a) The initial discussions regarding Mr Bradley's appointment 86
(b) Concurrent
proposals to allow for magistrates to be
appointed on contract 90
(c) Mr Flynn's letter of 7 January 1998 99
(d) The Ministerial of 12 January 1998 101
(e) Preparation of a draft bill to amend the Magistrates Act 103
(f) Criticism of the proposed amendments 143
(g) Mr Flynn's draft Ministerial of 10 February 1998 145
(h) Mr
Flynn's Ministerial of 12 February 1998 154
(i) Concurrent
developments regarding the introduction
of fixed term appointments for magistrates 161
(j) Further criticisms of the proposal to introduce fixed
term appointments 165
(k) Mr Stone's response to
the criticisms 166
(l) Mr Bradley's
appointment by the Administrator 169
(m) The immediate aftermath 172
(n) Later developments 173
(a) Mr Flynn 176
(b) Mr Toohey 195
The relevant legislative provisions 329
The respondents' submissions 333
Findings regarding NAALAS' ultra vires argument 338
NAALAS' submissions 345
The respondents' submissions 365
IS KABLE
APPLICABLE TO THE TENURE AND REMUNERATION
OF JUDICIAL OFFICERS? 417